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Abstract 
The outcomes of educational assessments undoubtedly have real implications for students, 
teachers, schools and education in the widest sense. Assessment results are, for example, used 
to award qualifications that determine future educational or vocational pathways of students. 
The results obtained by students in assessments are also used to gauge individual teacher 
quality, to hold schools to account for the standards achieved by their students, and to 
compare international education systems. Given the current high-stakes nature of educational 
assessment, it is imperative that the measurement practices involved have stable 
philosophical foundations. However, this paper casts doubt on the theoretical underpinnings 
of contemporary educational measurement models. Aspects of Wittgenstein’s later 
philosophy and Bohr’s philosophy of quantum theory are used to argue that a quantum 
theoretical rather than a Newtonian model is appropriate for educational measurement, and 
the associated implications for the concept of validity are elucidated. Whilst it is 
acknowledged that the transition to a quantum theoretical framework would not lead to the 
demise of educational assessment, it is argued that, where practical, current high-stakes 
assessments should be reformed to become as ‘low-stakes’ as possible. The paper also 
undermines some of the pro high-stakes testing rhetoric that has a tendency to afflict 
education. 
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Introduction 
This paper challenges the theoretical foundations of contemporary educational measurement 
models and proposes an alternative paradigm for the measurement of educational predicates. 
It is argued that current educational measurement practices are based upon a Newtonian 
conception of measurement. The quantum pioneer Niels Bohr was adamant, however, that the 
properties of intentional psychological predicates (such as learning) fit the framework of 
quantum theory, which superseded Newtonian mechanics (that functions perfectly well for 
macrosystems) as the best physical model of microsystems in the early part of the twentieth 
century. Although Bohr referred to structural parallels between quantum theory and 
psychology (and, by extension, education), he never developed these claims; they are, 
however, investigated in the current paper. Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later philosophy contains 
an extensive analysis of the nature of intentional predicates and this is used, together with 
Bohr’s philosophy of quantum mechanics, to demonstrate that a quantum theoretical 
paradigm would, in fact, provide a more secure basis for educational measurement. Finally, 
the implications of a transition from a Newtonian to a quantum theoretical framework for the 
concept of validity in educational measurement are considered. 
 
Psychology’s “physics envy” 
From the advent of psychology, some psychologists have sought to have the discipline 
recognised as a quantitative science and, according to Lagemann (2000), educational 
researchers simply followed suit. In formulating quantitative theories, psychologists re-
defined measurement to suit their own purposes and attempted to measure psychological 
attributes, such as cognitive abilities, in the same way as the properties of macroscopic bodies 
are measured in Newtonian physics (Bruner, 1990). For example, item response theory is 
used in conjunction with structural equation modelling to estimate ability levels of 
individuals from their responses to test items. In this approach, it is assumed that ability 
levels can be abstracted away from the measuring instrument in the same way as a 
measurement of a dynamic attribute of a macroscopic body in Newtonian mechanics. 
Michell (1997) casts considerable doubt on the legitimacy of contemporary approaches to 
psychological measurement. He asserts that, for measurements of psychological attributes to 
be legitimate, what he refers to as the “scientific task” (Michell, 1997, p. 359) of 
measurement must be properly investigated prior to commencing work on the “instrumental 
task” (Michell, 1997, p. 359). In other words, it is vital to demonstrate that psychological 
attributes are quantitative, and therefore measurable, before devising methods for actually 
measuring them. 
Michell (1997, 1999) argues that, since psychological attributes lack additivity, they cannot 
be continuous quantities of the type encountered in Newtonian physics. According to Michell 
(1999, p. 71), additivity of an attribute is demonstrated if there is an actual physical process 
for combining magnitudes of the attribute so that: 
1. wxxw +=+  for any two magnitudes, w and x, of the attribute, and 
2. )()( yxwyxw ++=++  for any three magnitudes w, x and y of the attribute, and 
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3. The combined magnitude of the attribute is unchanged if equivalent objects are substituted 
– objects which have the same magnitudes as the individual objects that are being 
combined. 
For example, combining two objects on a single set of weighing scales would be such a 
method in the case of weight. Michell’s thesis is that there is no such process for combining 
magnitudes of psychological attributes such as cognitive abilities. As a consequence of his 
extensive critique of psychological measurement, in which he appeals to the mathematical 
foundations of measurement, Michell concludes: “These observations confirm that 
psychology, as a discipline, has its own definition of measurement, a definition quite unlike 
the traditional concept used in the physical sciences” (Michell, 1997, p. 360). Boring (1929) 
points out that the pioneers of psychology quickly came to realise that if psychology was not 
a quantitative discipline which facilitated measurement, psychologists could not adopt the 
epithet “scientist” for “there would … have been little of the breath of science in the 
experimental body, for we hardly recognize a subject as scientific if measurement is not one 
of its tools” (Michell, 1990, p. 7). 
The general definition of measurement accepted by most quantitative psychologists and 
educationalists is that formulated by Stevens (1946), which states: “measurement is the 
assignment of numerals to objects or events according to rule” (Michell, 1997, p. 360). 
Stevens realised that, by predicating measurement just upon numerical representation, 
without the need for additivity, he could ratify and legitimise the measurement practices used 
by psychologists and liberate them from the need to test the underlying quantitative structure 
of psychological attributes. One of the consequences of this is that 
psychologists/educationalists assign numbers to attributes according to some pre-determined 
rule and do not consider the need to justify the measurement procedures used so long as the 
rule is followed. For example, psychologists/educationalists use total test scores to measure 
cognitive abilities without considering the need to justify their rationale for doing so. 
Stevens’ rather vague definition distances measurement practices in psychology and 
education from measurement in classical Newtonian physics. 
A fundamental notion in quantum theory is that a measured attribute can only be understood 
in the context of the measurement situation. This facet of the quantum realm is in stark 
contrast to the Newtonian worldview. In Newtonian physics, systems possess their attributes 
intrinsically and measurement is construed as a process for checking up on some pre-existing 
property of the system. Niels Bohr, who is widely regarded as the father of quantum theory, 
identified “unambiguous communication”, rather than quantification, as the hallmark of 
science. To communicate measurement results unambiguously in quantum theory it is 
essential to factor in a description of the measuring instrument: the entity to be measured and 
the measuring instrument are non-separable. 
The transition in physics from a Newtonian to a quantum theoretical model of reality should 
have had implications for psychology (Gigerenzer, 1987) and therefore also for education. 
Bruner (1990, p. xiii) warns that: “The study of the human mind is so difficult, so caught in 
the dilemma of being both the object and the agent of its own study, that it cannot limit its 
inquiries to ways of thinking that grew out of yesterday’s physics.” Bruner is referring to the 
difficulty of dividing up the mind into that which is the object of introspection (some region 
of the mind) and the introspecting agent (the mind itself). Bohr also refers to exactly the same 
problem: 
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The epistemological problem under discussion may be characterized briefly as follows: 
For describing our mental activity, we require, on one hand, an objectively given 
content to be placed in opposition to a perceiving subject, while, on the other hand, as is 
already implied in such an assertion, no sharp separation between object and subject 
can be maintained, since the perceiving subject also belongs to our mental content. 
(Bohr, 1934/1987, p. 96) 
Bohr believed that psychology and quantum theory share a common goal: to use ordinary 
language, learned through direct experience, to describe what transcends direct experience. 
He was of the view that he had identified an “epistemological argument common to both 
fields” (Bohr, 1958/1987, p. 27). Similar claims have been made by other quantum pioneers, 
for example: “It is the occurrence of similar concepts and thought models in both physics and 
psychology that makes Pauli so certain that they rest on a foundation of shared structures.” 
(Gieser, 2005, p. 345)  
The author draws on aspects of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and Bohr’s philosophy of 
quantum mechanics to argue that education and psychology share the same “measurement 
problem” as Bohr’s so-called “Copenhagen interpretation” of quantum theory. Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy of psychology is utilised since the eminent quantum physicist Werner Heisenberg 
links the Copenhagen interpretation to Wittgenstein’s later philosophy (Stapp, 1972, p. 1114). 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophical writings are used to establish that it is meaningless to 
ascribe a definite ability to an unmeasured individual; the ascription of a definite ability is 
only meaningful in a specific measurement context. In particular, if learning is construed as 
following simple rules to “go beyond the information given” (Bruner, 1996, p. 129), it is 
evident that Wittgenstein’s extensive analysis of rule-following has implications for 
educational measurement. Accordingly, the following section summarises this important 
aspect of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. The process of going beyond given information can 
be illustrated most effectively using mathematical rule-following, but the ideas apply to all 
rule-following from speaking a language to playing chess.  
 
Wittgenstein’s analysis of rule-following 
Wittgenstein (2009, §185) considers a scenario in which a child continues the arithmetical 
sequence 0, 2, 4, 6, … beyond 1000 by writing 1000, 1004, 1008, 1012, and so on. 
Wittgenstein argues that there is a possibility the child has understood the order to continue 
the sequence as the community of mathematicians would understand the instruction “Add 2 
up to 1000, 4 up to 2000, 6 up to 3000, and so on”. Wittgenstein is using this example to 
communicate that, on the basis of a finite number of illustrations of a rule (the rule for the 
sequence of even numbers in this case), it is possible to attach multiple interpretations to the 
rule. 
In the latter part of the 20th century, cognitivism superseded behaviourism as the dominant 
psychological paradigm for understanding mental functions. It therefore seems 
uncontroversial to view the source of the child’s ability to follow a rule as a finite object in 
his or her mind, and an obvious contender for this in the case of mathematical rule-following 
is a formula. However, having a formula in mind is insufficient to explain mathematical rule-
following behaviour since, in Wittgenstein’s view, a rule by itself leads to a paradox in that, 
on the basis of some interpretation of its requirements, any answer can be made to accord or 
to conflict with the rule: 
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This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every 
course of action can be brought into accord with the rule. The answer was: if every 
course of action can be brought into accord with the rule, then it can also be brought 
into conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here. 
(Wittgenstein, 2009, §201) 
For example, it is possible for a child to write 10 (as one would expect) or -230 (as one would 
not expect) when he or she is asked to supply the next term in the sequence 2, 4, 6, 8, ... . The 
child who gives 10 as their answer is attaching the orthodox interpretation nun 2= , while the 
child who proffers -230 can claim to be acting in accord with the instruction to continue the 
sequence by attaching the interpretation )4)(3)(2)(1(102 −−−−−= nnnnnun  since both 
formulae clearly yield the given first four terms of the sequence. 
It is over-simplistic to posit that, if God were to search the contents of the child’s mind and 
uncover the formula nun 2= , then the child must supply 10 as the next term in the sequence 
2, 4, 6, 8, ... . Analogously, discovery of the formula )4)(3)(2)(1(102 −−−−−= nnnnnun  
does not guarantee that the child will proffer -230 as the fifth even number. The child may 
indeed have the formula nun 2=  in mind but be unable to use it correctly. Merely having a 
mental object (the formula in this case) before one’s mind may be insufficient since the child 
may be unable to interpret the object correctly. Perhaps the characteristic which distinguishes 
the child who can successfully go on to apply a formula correctly from the child who cannot, 
is the possession of a further mental object which permits the child to attach the correct 
interpretation to the formula. Unfortunately this will not resolve the conundrum since, if the 
mind is construed as being populated by mental objects (formulae, images, and so on) which 
require interpretation, an infinite regress ensues: 
If it [the rule] requires interpretation, that could be done in lots of ways. So how do I 
tell which interpretation is correct? Does that, for instance, call for a further rule – a 
rule for determining correct interpretation of the original – and if so, why does it not 
raise the same difficulty again, thereby generating a regress? (Wright, 2001, p. 163) 
It is thus evident that an appeal to interpretations does not settle whether the child should 
offer 10 or -230 as the fifth even number. Having a formula before one’s mind does not 
guarantee the subsequent correct use of that formula, and the introduction of interpretation 
cannot resolve the problem. 
Wittgenstein (2009) anticipates that there may be an attempt to rescue the situation by 
introducing the idea of a Platonic mechanism in the child’s mind, which gives the child 
access to all potential future applications of a rule without the need for interpretation or, 
indeed, any act of creativity on the child’s part. In this situation, the child would be following 
a “rules-as-rails” model where the rules “somehow reach ahead of us and determine of 
themselves every actual and counterfactual proper application” (Wright, 2001, p. 163). 
Wittgenstein, however, rejected such an explanation of rule-following, as illustrated by his 
view of mathematical rule-following: “The mathematician is an inventor, not a discoverer” 
(Wittgenstein, 1978, I, §168). 
In Wittgenstein’s view, private rule-following within the realm of one’s mind is impossible 
since the public criteria associated with a well-established practice (into which the rule-
follower must be enculturated through training) are used to judge correct and incorrect 
applications of a rule: 
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‘[F]ollowing a rule’ is a practice. And to think one is following a rule is not to follow a 
rule. And that’s why it’s not possible to follow a rule ‘privately’; otherwise, thinking 
one was following a rule would be the same thing as following it. (Wittgenstein, 2009, 
§202) 
Wittgenstein’s appeal to public, behavioural criteria in his exegesis of rule-following, rather 
than focusing on associated inner mental states and processes might be construed as 
indicating that his views are aligned with behaviourism. Wittgenstein, however, denies that 
he endorses behaviourism when he says “If I speak of a fiction, then it is of a grammatical 
fiction” (Wittgenstein, 2009, §307) in response to the following questions posed by the 
interlocutor: “Aren’t you ... a behaviourist in disguise? Aren’t you nevertheless basically 
saying that everything except human behaviour is a fiction?” (Wittgenstein, 2009, §307) 
Contrary to some readings of Wittgenstein, he does not deny the existence of mental states 
and processes. Rather, he posits that mental states are inextricably linked to outer behaviour: 
“An ‘inner process’ stands in need of outward criteria.” (Wittgenstein, 2009, §580) 
Wittgenstein denies that mental states stand in a direct causal relation to outer behaviour, as 
per a Newtonian paradigm. Interestingly, he actually steers a path between cognitivism and 
behaviourism when he asserts, in relation to the nature of mental states, “It’s [a mental state] 
not a Something, but not a Nothing either! The conclusion was only that a Nothing would 
render the same service as a Something about which nothing can be said.” (Wittgenstein, 
2009, §304) In this quotation, Wittgenstein is rejecting the notion that, in following a rule for 
example, an individual is guided by some type of mental object (a “something”) which is 
hidden behind behaviour or indeed that rule-following is reducible without residue to outer 
behaviour, so that what remains within is a “nothing”. 
The following section sets out the rationale for adopting a quantum-theoretical measurement 
paradigm in education. In addition, Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, and his analysis of rule-
following in particular, is used to establish a set of equivalences between the study of 
educational/psychological predicates and the study of quantum predicates. 
 
The study of educational predicates: quantum analogues 
Why should a theory formulated for analysing the behaviour of microentities such as 
electrons apply to the study of psychological predicates of interest to educationalists such as 
learning, thinking, understanding, and so on? According to Bohr, the primary concern of the 
quantum physicist is to communicate unambiguously about aspects of reality which are not 
visible to the human eye, using ordinary language developed to make sense of the world of 
everyday experience. The constructs of interest to quantum theorists, such as electrons and 
photons, manifest themselves in macroscopic measuring devices which can be read by the 
human eye. Physicists then communicate their experimental findings to colleagues using 
ordinary language supplemented by some specialist vocabulary. 
The predicates of interest to psychologists and educationalists similarly cannot be observed 
directly but, rather, manifest themselves in the responses of individuals to measuring 
instruments such as tests. The words “position” and “velocity” function perfectly well when 
used to characterise the motion of tennis balls, for example, but cannot be used in common-
sense ways to describe electrons and photons, which cannot be observed directly. Bohr, 
however, insists that everyday concepts like position and velocity must be retained in 
quantum theory but used in a more restrictive way, in the sense that it is necessary to factor in 
a description of the measuring instrument when referring to a measurement of position or 
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velocity in the quantum realm. It is argued in the current paper that similar restrictions need 
to be placed on measurements of abilities in education, i.e. it is necessary to refer to the 
ability of an individual with respect to a particular question on a test rather than referring to 
ability as an attribute that exists independently of an act of measurement. 
• The analogue of quantization 
In quantum theory, quantized attributes can only take certain discrete values. For example, 
the polarization of a photon is a quantized attribute since, for each direction, there are only 
two possibilities: either the photon is completely polarized in that direction or it is 
completely polarized perpendicular to that direction. 
Wittgenstein rejects the notion that a psychological attribute, such as understanding or 
ability, is purely a mental process: “In the sense in which there are processes (including 
mental processes) which are characteristic of understanding, understanding is not a mental 
process” (Wittgenstein, 2009, §154). This implies that, when one attempts to measure a 
psychological attribute such as ability, the measurement process cannot simply be a 
mechanism for checking up on the attribute. Consequently it is meaningless to posit that a 
general ability, of the type a test purports to measure, can be measured in the Newtonian 
sense. Consider an n-item mathematics test consisting of questions Q1, Q2, Q3, ..., Qn, 
where the response to each question is either correct or incorrect. In Wittgenstein’s view, 
“it’s not possible to follow a rule ‘privately’” (Wittgenstein, 2009, §202), and thus ability 
with respect to a given question must be publicly demonstrated. Wittgenstein advocates 
the need for an individual to repeatedly demonstrate conformity with a rule-governed 
practice (such as addition) before one can ascribe the ability to use the rule correctly to the 
individual. In reality, however, high-stakes educational assessments do not usually test the 
application of a particular rule on multiple occasions, and it is thus necessary to refer to 
the ability to apply a rule in the context of a particular question, which represents a 
deviation from Wittgenstein’s conception of demonstrating an ability. 
Furthermore, an individual will not have their ability with respect to a given question “in 
their mind” either before or after they answer the question and, therefore, their ability with 
respect to the question will be indeterminate both before and after they respond to it. It is 
noteworthy that the degree of uncertainty pertaining to the ability with respect to a 
particular question will be greater before the question is attempted than afterwards. The 
individual’s ability with respect to a given question will, however, be maximally certain at 
the instant they answer it, and this reinforces the fact that it is necessary to refer to their 
ability with respect to a particular question. Therefore, an individual’s ability is a 
relational attribute in the sense that it can only be spoken of in conjunction with a specific 
question on the test. In conformity with quantum theory, a measurement of ability and the 
measuring device, i.e., the mathematical practice that is being tested by the question, form 
an indivisible whole and it is meaningless to refer to the measurement without referring to 
the measuring device. The need to refer to the ability of an individual with respect to a 
particular question undermines the rationale for calculating total test scores (which are 
often purported to represent ability in a particular area), since the summing of item scores 
on a test is predicated on the notion that each item is measuring the same construct, e.g., 
“mathematical ability”. It is meaningless to combine scores in this way because no single 
ability exists. 
At the instant when a pupil answers a particular question, Qr, their ability with respect to 
Qr (the measuring instrument) will be known. In other words, the pupil will have 
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responded either correctly to Qr (i.e., in conformity with the criteria associated with the 
relevant practice that is being assessed by Qr), thus affirming their ability with respect to 
Qr, or incorrectly. Since there are only two discrete possibilities for each question, correct 
or incorrect, the pupil’s ability with respect to each test item is a quantized attribute. 
• The analogue of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle 
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, which is an important tenet of quantum theory, states 
that it is impossible to measure precisely both the position and the momentum of a 
microentity simultaneously. 
Consider again an n-item mathematics test consisting of questions Q1, Q2, Q3, ..., Qn, 
where the response to each question is either correct or incorrect. If an individual responds 
to question Qr at time tr, their ability with respect to Qr will be maximally certain at time 
tr. Again, since Wittgenstein posits that a rule cannot be followed privately (Wittgenstein, 
2009, §202), the individual’s ability with respect to Qr will be unknown either before or 
after tr. Similarly, if the individual answers question Qs at time ts (where s ≠ r), their 
ability with respect to Qs will be maximally certain at time ts but unknown either before or 
after ts. Clearly it is impossible for the individual to respond to two questions 
simultaneously and, therefore, it is only possible for the ability of the individual to be 
known with respect to a single question at any instant in time. This is the analogue of 
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle in quantum theory. 
• The analogue of wave-function collapse 
In quantum theory, a microentity does not possess its dynamic attributes before a 
measurement is made. Rather, the microentity exists in a superposition of different states, 
which correspond to the possible outcomes of the measurement process. A dynamic 
attribute of the microentity only manifests itself at the point of measurement when the 
microentity interacts with a measuring device. This interaction gives rise to a sudden and 
discontinuous jump in the relevant dynamic attribute of the microentity from a 
superposition of all possible values, with associated probabilities, to one actual 
measurement result. The probability wave-function, which incorporates information on all 
of the possible values and their respective probabilities, collapses to yield a single value at 
the point of measurement. 
Wittgenstein offers support for the applicability of the notion of wave-function collapse to 
the study of psychological and educational predicates when he argues that there is always 
a “jump” to make between a concept and its application in a particular context: 
In all language there is a bridge between the sign and its application. No one can 
make this for us; we have to bridge the gap ourselves. No explanation ever saves the 
jump, because any further explanation will itself need a jump. (Wittgenstein, 1982, 
p. 67) 
Consider once again an n-item mathematics test consisting of questions Q1, Q2, Q3, ..., Qn, 
where the response to each question is either correct or incorrect. Suppose also that the 
probability of an individual answering the question Qr correctly is pr. Immediately before 
an individual answers Qr, their ability with respect to Qr will, according to Wittgenstein’s 
paradox of interpretation (discussed in the section on rule-following), be characterised by 
a superposition of two different states corresponding to the two possible outcomes of their 
response to Qr: 
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1. Correct response to Qr, with associated probability pr, and 
2. Incorrect response to Qr, with associated probability 1 – pr. 
According to Wittgenstein (2009), the pupil in isolation could, under some interpretation 
of the requirements of Qr, construe either the correct or an incorrect answer to Qr as 
correct. For example, Kripke (1982) considers a situation in which an individual who has 
only previously added whole numbers less than 57 asserts that the correct answer to the 
mathematical question “What is 68 + 57?” is “5” rather than “125”. Kripke (1982) argues 
that it is possible the individual is using an alternative interpretation of “+” whereby the 
“+” symbol is being used to denote what he calls the “quus” function instead of ordinary 
arithmetic addition. Kripke (1982) defines the rule for the “quus” function, which he 
denotes by “⊕ ”, as follows: 
x ⊕  y = x + y  if x, y < 57  
x ⊕  y = 5  otherwise. 
Prior to the individual answering the question, they are in a superposition of two states 
(their answer is both “125” and “5”), but when they actually answer the question, the 
superposition collapses to just one answer (either “125” or “5”). 
Prior to actually answering Qr, the individual’s ability with respect to Qr is in a 
superposition of two states simultaneously. However, at the instant when the individual 
answers Qr, the superposition of the two states “correct” and “incorrect” will collapse to 
just one: the actual measurement of the pupil’s ability with respect to Qr. The assessor’s 
knowledge of the pupil’s ability with respect to Qr jumps instantaneously from an 
uncertain state to a certain state, since the pupil’s actual answer to Qr will be either correct 
or incorrect. The process of measurement results in a sudden jump in the assessor’s 
knowledge of the pupil’s ability with respect to Qr, from a combination of possible 
outcomes, each with an associated probability, to one actual outcome. The assessor’s 
knowledge of the relevant ability changes from indeterminate to determinate. The sudden 
jump in the assessor’s knowledge of the pupil’s ability with respect to Qr is the analogue 
of the process of wave-function collapse in quantum theory. 
• The analogue of complementarity 
Bohr’s principle of complementarity is a central feature of the Copenhagen interpretation 
of quantum theory. In the quantum world some observations can never be made 
simultaneously. For example, one cannot observe a microentity as both a particle and as a 
wave at the same time. A microentity behaves as a particle when it is observed, but is 
characterised by a probability wave between observations. The two situations cannot occur 
simultaneously, i.e., they are mutually exclusive, but both are necessary to fully describe 
the microentity’s nature. Bohr believed that the complementarity principle accommodates 
the paradoxical nature of the wave-particle duality exhibited by microentities. He 
contended that “evidence obtained under different conditions cannot be comprehended 
within a single picture, but must be regarded as complementary in the sense that only the 
totality of the phenomena exhausts the possible information about the objects” (cited in 
Kumar, 2009, p. 242). 
The complementarity principle states that the separate descriptions of the quantum realm 
obtained from different measurement events, or measured versus unmeasured systems, 
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cannot be combined into a single comprehensive description of reality. Rather, it is only 
possible to give a sequence of complementary descriptions which correspond to different 
measurement situations, or to the measured versus the unmeasured system. Honner (1987, 
p. 59) refers to the type of complementarity that exists between the descriptions of a 
system corresponding to different measurement situations as “weak” complementarity. For 
example, if a photon passes through a sequence of n polarizing disks then, to completely 
describe the photon’s polarization with respect to each of the disks, it is necessary to give 
n distinct statements, all of which are complementary (rather than contradictory) to each 
other. Honner (1987, p. 59) contends, however, that the complementarity that exists 
between the descriptions of a measured versus unmeasured system (e.g., the wave and 
particle manifestations of an electron corresponding respectively to the unmeasured and 
measured states of the electron), which he refers to as “strong” complementarity, is more 
closely aligned with Bohr’s original conception of complementarity. Accordingly, the 
analogue of strong complementarity in the study of psychological and educational 
predicates will be discussed in this section. 
Wittgenstein (2009) demonstrated that there is a radical asymmetry between first-person 
present tense use and third-person present tense use of psychological concepts. First-
person use and third-person use of mental predicates are asymmetrical with respect to their 
methods of verification since third-person use is based upon behavioural criteria, whereas 
first-person use is not. However, despite this asymmetry in their methods of verification, 
first-person and third-person use of mental concepts have, according to Wittgenstein, a 
univocity of meaning since they are linked to common behavioural criteria. 
In Wittgenstein’s view, asymmetry of use but univocity of meaning is a feature of all 
psychological predicates including intentional predicates such as thinking, learning, 
understanding, and so on. For example, it is meaningful to speak of correct or incorrect in 
third-person use of the word “ability”, but it is meaningless to speak of correct or incorrect 
in first-person use of the word “ability” (as there are no criteria to adjudicate on first-
person use). Similarly third-person use of the word “ability” is based on description, 
whereas first-person use is not, so that first and third-person uses of an intentional 
predicate are mutually exclusive. However, both first-person and third-person perspectives 
are necessary to give a full account of an intentional predicate. As Bohr noted, “debates 
between behavioristic and introspectivist positions in psychology can be resolved by 
recognizing that both are necessary to complement each other for a full account of human 
experience” (Faye and Folse in Bohr, 1998, p. 19). First-person use of an intentional 
predicate precludes third-person use and the two uses are therefore not contradictory but, 
rather, complementary. Therefore, the asymmetry of first-person and third-person uses of 
intentional predicates, such as learning, is analogous to strong complementarity in 
quantum theory. 
• The analogue of irreducible uncertainty and objective probability 
Quantum theory cannot determine the exact behaviour of microentities but, rather, only 
permits probabilities of different possible outcomes to be calculated. Quantum uncertainty 
is irreducible in the sense that it cannot be reduced by acquiring further information about 
the system being considered, and the probabilities associated with the uncertainty are 
objective rather than subjective. The resort to probabilities is not associated with 
ignorance, and the irreducible uncertainty is simply a fact of the natural world. No 
theoretical approach has hitherto managed to circumvent the irreducible uncertainty in the 
quantum realm. 
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However, the situation in classical physics is very different from the quantum world. In 
classical Newtonian mechanics, it is only necessary to resort to probability when there is 
incomplete information regarding a particular system. Consider, for example, the situation 
that arises when an unbiased coin is tossed. If all of the parameters pertaining to the coin’s 
motion were known, e.g., initial position, initial velocity, coefficient of restitution between 
the coin and the surface upon which it lands, etc. were known, it would be possible to 
predict, with certainty, the outcome of the coin-tossing experiment (Strzałko et al., 2008). 
In practice, however, at least some of these parameters will be unknown, and it is this 
“classical ignorance” which leads to probabilities being invoked to describe the 
experimental outcomes. Probabilities of this type are subjective since the uncertainty with 
which they are associated would be reduced if further information were available. Indeed, 
with complete information regarding all of the parameters influencing the motion of the 
coin, the uncertainty would yield to certainty. 
The Cartesian conception of the mind leads to the belief that, in the study of educational 
predicates such as thinking, the probabilities an individual associates with another 
person’s thoughts are subjective, since the individual does not have direct access to the 
private mental states of the other person. Those aligned with the Cartesian view posit that 
there would be no uncertainty, and therefore no need to resort to probabilities, if it were 
possible for the individual to have direct access to the mental states of the other person. 
In Wittgenstein’s rejection of Cartesianism, one’s uncertainty in describing another 
person’s mental states does not flow from ignorance of those mental states. According to 
Wittgenstein, when a person expresses a thought, for example, they are not describing an 
inner state with which the expression can be checked for accuracy. Wittgenstein’s private 
language argument rejects the existence of 
… a language in which a person could write down or give voice to his inner 
experiences – his feelings, moods, and so on ... The words of this language are to 
refer to what only the speaker can know – to his immediate private sensations. So 
another person cannot understand the language. (Wittgenstein, 2009, §243) 
This suggests that the mental states of a person are not directly comparable with the 
person’s subsequent actions and, therefore, that the uncertainty pertaining to the person’s 
mental predicates cannot be reduced by inspecting their mental states. 
Furthermore, if thoughts were self-contained, isolated brain processes that could be 
analysed using a brain imaging device, this would violate the characteristic first-
person/third-person asymmetry which Wittgenstein (2009) identified as a feature of all 
mental predicates. First-person/third-person asymmetry refers to the fact that third-person 
ascriptions of psychological predicates are based upon the use of criteria whereas first-
person ascriptions are not. If the asymmetry is the defining property of the mental, then 
mental phenomena cannot be captured in brain processes: 
But the view that thoughts and feelings are brain-processes abolishes this logical 
difference. If this view were true, you and I would stand on the same level in regard 
to what I think and feel. In order to ascertain my thoughts and feelings you and I 
would equally have to rely on advanced technology and scientific theory. (Malcolm, 
1986, p. 191) 
Alas, physical entities such as brain processes are governed by first-person/third person 
symmetry rather than asymmetry since both first-person and third-person ascriptions of 
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physical predicates entail the invocation of criteria. “After all, we say that Jones is six foot 
tall for the very same reason we say that we are.” (Suter, 1989, p. 153) Entities 
characterised by first-person/third-person asymmetry cannot be construed as identical to 
entities characterised by first-person/third-person symmetry. 
Therefore, the probabilities associated with mental predicates are objective, rather than 
subjective, since the uncertainty does not arise as a consequence of either human or 
instrumental limitations. Even if direct access to inner mental states were possible, it 
would reveal nothing and, consequently, the uncertainty associated with mental predicates 
is irreducible in the same way as the uncertainty in the quantum realm. 
• The analogue of local hidden variables 
Einstein was an objective realist who believed strongly in a deterministic universe in 
which it is always possible to trace a clear path from local cause to effect. He refused to 
accept that quantum theory represents a complete fundamental theory of the natural world. 
A number of quantum theorists hold that Einstein insisted there must be “elements of 
reality” which, if incorporated into quantum theory, would make it a more complete theory 
of physical reality. Einstein’s “elements of reality” are construed by physicists to refer to 
local hidden variables, i.e., Platonic “look-up lists” which dictate the values of the 
dynamic attributes of a microentity in every possible measurement scenario. For example, 
according to Einstein, an unmeasured photon possesses a type of instruction list that 
identifies the photon’s polarization along every possible angle before it is actually 
measured. However, Bell’s theorem (Bell, 1964) proves conclusively that local hidden 
variables of this type do not exist. 
Consider again an n-item mathematics test consisting of questions Q1, Q2, Q3, ..., Qn, 
where the response to each question is either correct or incorrect, and suppose that an 
individual is about to answer a particular question Qr on the test. If the equivalent of 
Einstein’s local hidden variables were to exist in the context of educational measurement, 
then the individual’s ability with respect to Qr would be definite in advance of their 
answer to the question. In other words, the individual would have a hidden, internal “look-
up list” in their mind which would guide their response to Qr. According to this view, 
whilst the assessor, due to their ignorance of these hidden variables, does not know how 
the individual will respond to Qr before it is actually answered, the individual’s response 
could be predicted if this ignorance were eradicated. However, Wittgenstein’s later 
philosophy suggests that such a view is implausible.  
Wittgenstein counsels against looking for hidden causes of the behaviour associated with 
mental phenomena since he claims such a quest leads to conceptual confusion: 
Now we try to get hold of the mental process of understanding, which seems to be 
hidden behind those coarser, and therefore more readily visible, concomitant 
phenomena. But it doesn’t work; or, more correctly, it does not get as far as a real 
attempt. For even supposing I had found something that happened in all those cases 
of understanding, why should that be the understanding? ... And if I say it is hidden 
– then how do I know what I have to look for? I am in a muddle. (Wittgenstein, 
2009, §153) 
In particular, he denies that the mental life of an individual is guided by latent, internal 
representations such as mental images. Wittgenstein concedes that mental images may be 
accompaniments of thinking but he vehemently denies that such images actually determine 
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how thoughts are expressed. If mental images were to determine the thinking of an 
individual, then Wittgenstein’s paradox of interpretation (discussed in the section on rule-
following) would lead to the bizarre consequence that the individual in isolation might 
always be mistaken about their thoughts. 
In Wittgenstein’s (2009) view, a rule-follower is neither following a rule arbitrarily nor 
being guided by local hidden variables such as mental images. Rather, the rule-follower’s 
guidance is non-local: their past training. The training is non-local since it is not stored 
inside the rule-follower as some form of mental object, and hidden in the sense that the 
training itself (rather than its consequences) does not have any physical manifestation that 
is detectable by physically examining the rule-follower. Wittgenstein acknowledges that 
human beings have a repertoire of natural responses that can be moulded through training. 
However, he rejects the notion that training simply induces physical changes to 
neurological pathways in the brain that could be measured by an appropriate imaging 
device, since this would undermine the first-person/third-person asymmetry that is 
characteristic of psychological predicates (see above). Whilst changes to brain states 
obviously could be measured, the entity represented by the measurement would be 
governed by first-person/third-person symmetry and, therefore, it would be at variance 
with our common conception of psychological attributes. If one attempted to measure, for 
example, understanding using such advanced technology, the measurement would actually 
be of an entirely different predicate, understanding*, say, that is incongruous with our 
everyday conception of understanding. Furthermore, as described in the section on rule-
following, Wittgenstein rejected the idea of a Platonic mechanism in an individual’s mind 
that somehow gives access to all future applications of a rule. 
Therefore, an individual who is just about to answer question Qr on the n-item 
mathematics test cannot be guided by something in mind; the individual does not have a 
hidden “look-up list” that predetermines their answer to Qr. Wittgenstein’s philosophical 
discussions on the nature of meaning and understanding lead to the same conclusion for 
psychology and education as Bell’s theorem led to for quantum theory: local hidden 
variables that guide behaviour are untenable. 
The structural parallels that have been established between the study of 
educational/psychological predicates and quantum theory suggest that a quantum theoretical 
framework would provide a more secure philosophical basis for educational measurement 
than the Newtonianism that underpins contemporary measurement models. The essential 
features of this alternative measurement paradigm for educational predicates are summarised 
in the following section. 
 
Quantum measurement paradigm for educational predicates 
Traditionally educationalists have viewed measurement through a Newtonian lens, in the 
sense that measurement is construed as a process for checking up on an innate psychological 
attribute of a person: their ability. In the Newtonian tradition, ability is viewed as an intrinsic 
attribute of an individual which stands in a causal relation to their responses to the questions 
on a mathematics test, for example. The responses are judged to be “correct” or “incorrect” 
according to an independent standard that is external to the individual. 
Consider again an n-item mathematics test consisting of questions Q1, Q2, Q3, ..., Qn, where 
the response to each question is either “correct” or “incorrect”. In the quantum theoretical 
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framework for educational measurement, it is meaningless to speak of ability as an intrinsic 
property of an individual. Rather, it is only meaningful to refer to the individual’s ability with 
respect to a given question at the instant when they actually respond to it. Therefore, an 
individual’s responses to the n questions will constitute n discrete measurements of their 
mathematical ability with respect to each question. 
Prior to measuring an individual’s ability with respect to a given question, they are in a 
superposition of two states: their answer is both “correct” and “incorrect”. The superposition 
is ontological rather than epistemological. It is not that one does not know which state the 
individual is in, but they really are in both states simultaneously. When a measurement is 
made, the superposition collapses to yield one actual measurement result: the answer is either 
“correct” or “incorrect”, and the uncertainty pertaining to which outcome will be actualised 
in the measurement process is irreducible. During the measurement, the individual and the 
measuring device, i.e. the practice assessed by the question, form a unified and non-separable 
system that actually influences the measured value of the ability. 
If an individual answers all n items on the hypothetical mathematics test, their ability will be 
definite on n distinct occasions (when they are answering each of the n items) and 
indeterminate between consecutive items (when they are not responding to a specific item). 
According to Bohr’s principle of complementarity, it is necessary to give n distinct 
descriptions (one corresponding to the individual’s ability with respect to each test item) to 
completely capture the individual’s mathematical ability. It is impossible to combine the n 
statements since they are all necessary to give a complete description of the individual’s 
mathematical ability. A consequence of this re-construal of educational measurement is that 
total test scores are meaningless since the rationale for summing item scores on a test is that 
each item is measuring the same construct, e.g., “mathematical ability”. The scores cannot be 
combined in the quantum measurement paradigm because no single ability exists.  
 
Conclusion: Implications for validity and the future of educational measurement  
Educationalists consider validity to be a critical issue in assuring the accuracy of the 
instruments which they use to measure ability levels. For example, in 1989 the British 
Psychological Society’s Steering Committee on Test Standards defined validity as “the extent 
to which a test measures what it claims to be measuring, the extent to which it is possible to 
make appropriate inferences from the test score” (cited in Coaley, 2009, pp. 129-130). 
Educationalists contend that a test is valid if variations in the ability measured by the test are 
causally related to variations in the measurements derived from the test. The central tenet of 
validity in the context of educational measurement is the facility to abstract a measurement of 
ability away from the measuring instrument. The concept of validity evidently presupposes 
that an individual possesses an intrinsic ability level which is independent of the instrument 
used to measure it. 
The quantum measurement paradigm presented in the current paper stresses that an 
individual’s ability is actually a joint property of the individual and a particular test item. It is 
simply meaningless to divorce the ability from the measuring instrument. The author thus 
contends that the concept of validity as it is traditionally conceived in educational 
measurement is a misnomer. 
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The erosion of the notion of validity in educational measurement has grave implications for 
the legitimacy of the high-stakes assessments that currently dominate the educational 
landscape. Assessment results are, for example, used to award qualifications that determine 
future educational or vocational pathways of students. The results obtained by students in 
assessments are also used to gauge individual teacher quality, to hold schools to account for 
the standards achieved by their students, and to compare international education systems. 
Whilst it is acknowledged that transition to a quantum theoretical framework would not lead 
to the demise of educational assessment, the author believes that the focus on high-stakes 
assessments should be reduced. Ideally such assessments should be reformed to become as 
‘low-stakes’ as possible through, for example, placing greater emphasis on qualitatively 
describing what students can do in particular contexts, rather than on attempting to quantify 
their educational achievements. 
High-stakes assessments may, however, be justifiable in some contexts, despite the fact they 
do not yield valid measures of ability. There may still be strong links between a measurement 
produced by a test and a future expected outcome, which are useful for practical inductive 
reasoning, such as for making employment decisions, even if the test does not provide an 
accurate, ongoing, present-tense descriptor for the entity it purports to measure. It is the 
predictive strength of test scores that should determine if high-stakes assessments are 
justifiable in particular contexts. The ultimate consequence of the measurement model 
described in the current paper is to undermine some of the pro high-stakes assessment 
rhetoric that afflicts education, such as when authorities claim with an unjustifiably high 
degree of confidence what assessment data do or do not show, or they make epistemic claims 
about ability levels on the basis of test scores. 
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